Principles on Which the Examination Is Carried On

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I turn now to the revelation itself on which Christianity is based. The real object of Mr. N.'s book is to destroy the Christianity from which he gained almost all the wisdom he has. It is not very kind to others. Would he be the only depositary of it in some improved shape into which it has been refined in his mind?
Our task now must be to examine Mr. N.'s reasonings as to the revelation he rejects.
And here, at the outset, I stumble on what proves the whole course of his argument, from one end of the book to the other, to be utterly illogical and unsound. His inquiry really is as to the truth and certainty, and hence the authority, of the revelation which the book called pre-eminently "the Bible" professes to give. Is it a credible authoritative revelation from God? Now, by his own confession, he has conducted this inquiry upon a principle which makes it impossible ever to receive any revelation at all as such. That is, he begins his inquiry, and carries it on, on a principle which shows the whole inquiry itself to be absurd and useless. The conclusion was come to before he began, it being contained in the principle on which he set out. He inquires into the authority of a revelation on a principle which in itself denies such authority in any case.
"We cannot build up a system of authority on a basis of free criticism." (Phases, p. 213.) This, Mr. N. puts in italics, as the grand result he comes to. Why then inquire, if such or such a one be authoritative, by free criticism? Effectively, if my mind is superior to the object it is exercised upon, it cannot have, morally, authority over me.
But this only shows Mr. N.'s book to be an illogical absurdity; and that he assumed his conclusion in principle before he set out.
Mr. N. states, as to what practically amounts to this same principle, "Perhaps I could not have gained this result by any abstract act of thought, from want of freedom to think: and there are advantages, also, in expanding slowly under great pressure, if one can expand, and is not crushed by it." (Phases, p. 200.)
Now it is possible his mind had to go through a long process before it could divest itself of the outward influence of revelation. But when he had discovered that his inquiry was absurd (for it is absurd to inquire if a particular revelation is authoritative on a principle which denies the possibility of any being so), why should he communicate this absurd process of his own mind to others?
Not to show justness of logical reasoning to those who had power to estimate its justness! That is a clear case. Had truth been really his object, he would have stopped and said, "Whatever results as to details I may have arrived at, my inquiry has been carried on on an illogical absurd principle; and as the principle involves the impossibility of an authoritative revelation, my inquiry must be, Is there no other means of ascertaining whether there is one or not? Is free criticism (I speak of it such as Mr. N. presents it) itself the just means of trying the question?" But this would not have been Mr. N.'s book nor answered Mr. N.'s purpose.
But now I ask, What does Mr. N. mean by "free criticism," such as, in its nature, to exclude all possible authority? It means the absolute supremacy and competency of man's mind to judge everything. God is wholly excluded. And this is the grand principle of Mr. N.'s book: for to judge God, if He be there, is absurd and impossible. His authority and word must prevail; if He be there, He must be perfect and right; but He judges and cannot be judged, or He is not there as God. Mr. N. supposes a man judging whether something be of God or not; but if criticism excludes authority, it certainly excludes God Himself. It supposes the absence of God and His word always. It means-I exclude God, and judge of all for myself without Him; and I will never do anything else. So thought Job, till he met with Him, and found his own littleness. But this is the whole of Mr. N.'s principle. He will in no case allow God to come in; for then, surely, criticism ends. This, stated here in principle, is found in every page of the book. Bring God in in thought-and all is false. But for man to exclude Him is always false. It leaves out the grand spring, test, and key-stone of all moral truth.
If man says, "What, then, is to be done? Must not I judge morally before I receive anything as of God? Otherwise I may receive Hindooism or Mohammedanism." I will tell you what to do, if this be really so. Confess that you are away from Him. Is this the normal state of man? You are away from God, ignorant of God; or you would not need to use all this effort to know whether anything be of Him or not. I add, if you are away from Him, then confess your need of Him. But that would suppose a revelation or ruin. And such is the truth, and the efforts of free criticism involve it.
But, taken as a just human instrument, criticism, in the true sense and legitimate use of it, does not destroy authority. I admit that, morally, God's grace is necessary, because a corrupt -an "antagonist will" is to be dealt with; but, in the human sense, criticism does not exclude it. I may ascertain that a letter of my father is really his. When adequate evidence is acquired of that, his letter assumes at once his authority over me. Now the only thing that makes a difference in a divine communication is, that man is incompetent to judge of God, and has an antagonist will which will not receive Him. But this proves the necessity of a revelation and of divine grace-that is, of Christianity-unless man is to remain ignorant of God and opposed to Him.
The real secret of Mr. N.'s book is, that he desires to destroy confidence in Christianity. It is a common, very common, misfortune, through the weakness of our corrupt natures, to find invaluable moral truths mixed up with the grossest human corruptions. The divinely-wise man separates "the precious from the vile," and he becomes as God's mouth, being subject to truth from God. The self-confident man rejects all together, because his intellect is capable of seeing the corruption, and incapable of valuing the truth.
Such has been Mr. N.'s case. One knows it to be the case of millions who wear a transparent garb of popery, or, if bold enough or honest enough, have cast it off, and languish often in true and unsatisfied aspirations. How many have I met with in this state! How many, whom true Christianity made tell their thoughts of popery-ay, and the sorrows of their own hearts too -though they might not have the courage (that is, were not spiritual enough) to find a sufficient motive for being anything else!
But is there not this will, this desire, to destroy Christianity and all revelation? The whole book witnesses it; and often the speech of the author betrays him.
Thus, in a passage I shall permit myself to translate: "O false-named theology! O may the last part of so long a life remain to me, and energy (or breath), and whatever may be sufficient, to tell your deeds!" (Phases, p. 131.) Is there no will here?
Again: "If by independent methods, such as an examination of MSS., the spuriousness of the chapter could now be shown, this would verify the faculty of criticism which has already objected to its contents: thus it would justly encourage us to apply similar criticism to other passages." (Ib. p. 108.) Encourage us! What does that mean?
These show the animus of the book.
Let my reader allow me here to make a few remarks on the moral sentiments connected with a rejection of scripture. No doubt prepossessions of any kind warp the judgment; but indifference to what ought to have a place in the affections if true- indifference, that is, to its truth-chews a heart incapable by moral defect (while in that state) of judging justly in a moral question.
I have long, I suppose, looked at the portrait of my mother, who watched over my tender years with that care which a mother only knows how to bestow. I can just form some imperfect thought of her looks, for I was early bereft of her; but her eye fixed upon me the tender love which had me for its heart's object -which could win when I could know little else-which had my confidence before I knew what confidence was-by which I learned to love, because I felt I was loved, was the object of that love- which had its joy in serving me-which I took for granted must be, for I had never known aught else. All this which I had learned, and which was treasured in my heart and formed part of my nature, was linked with the features which hung before my gaze. That was my mother's picture. It recalled her, no longer sensibly present, to my heart. A retailer of pictures comes in, and tells me that, from the painter's name and style, it could not be my mother's. The date proved it. It could, at best, be an unlike drawing from memory. Is the quiet indifference of criticism here the proof of a right state of mind? I am astounded. I may be forced to acknowledge my mistake, to give up the much-loved memorial that brought her back to my thoughts; but I shall groan in heart-turn away-wish it were not so. Indifference would prove, not a good critic, but a worthless heart.
Is Christ's picture in the word less precious to me? He was taken early from man's sight, to whom He had shown this tender love. I have found-thought I found-His traits in the word. I know I have loved Him, and felt His love. That word recalls His love, gives me the expression of it. It is, has been, His look of love to me. Shall I feel "encouraged" to pursue criticisms which are to prove it all a fraud? He who has never tasted His love may; not I. Were I forced, I would cast it by with sorrow, lingeringly, if I must. I have lost what brought known love to my mind, what re-awakened thoughts and an image I had difficulty to recall. Be it so; His love may be true; but I sit down in sorrow. To pursue the criticism which "picks holes" in it I cannot. I lay it aside; I forget it; I do not trust it: but I shall not forget my sorrow. Did I take it up, it would be associated with my affections to what I know is true. I leave it, therefore, and admit it is better not to associate mistake with affection. But the loved Object I know of undoubtedly in my soul. That Mr. N. does not, never did, if I am to take his own account. The picture is gone, by what he supposes is sound criticism of these connoisseurs of pictures, and all is gone with it; for he had but the picture, and nothing else: and why should he not judge a picture, which is nothing else-worse than nothing, therefore, if a false one? For him Jesus is gone, with the written revelation of Him. He will believe enough of the history, indeed, to set Him down as an impostor, but has seen no trait of beauty in Himself which makes him regret to find Him such.
He has only by the process degraded his own mind to the point of considering an impostor among the most excellent of the earth.
Mr. N. must forgive me if I do not think he has gained by the process which has produced this result. I do not believe that he, when a professed Christian (though we know that where there is mere profession, men may be very wicked-away from God- and that we may all fall, though sincere), or any one who professed Christianity, would have associated with inquiries about God and His truth, the low-minded insinuations which are found in Mr. N.'s book, and which certainly I shall not copy. I am but a poor sinner, I well know: real Christians are inconsistent beings. The reality may be wanting when the doctrine is professed; but no one, even merely professing it, would have connected God's name and truth with filth. It is for an infidel to do that. That I may not seem unjust to Mr. N., I shall mention the pages where it is found, and no more. (Phases, pp. 129, 150.)