Brief Hints on the Greek Article

From: Collected Writings of J.N. Darby: Critical 1

Ephesians 2:21 • 32 min. read • grade level: 8

All my experience has confirmed the principle stated elsewhere, that the article is used when the object of the mind is spoken of, and is left out when the word or combination of words is characteristic. This does not at all conflict with its being the notion expressed by the substantive as viewed by the speaker as an individual, which, as another form of the thought, is correct enough, but gives no expression to the import of the absence of the article. All the particular cases and rules are but reducing expressions under the general principle, often multiplied (as in Middleton) by ignorance of it. I doubt altogether that his notion of the general rule not applying where there is a preposition, or with proper names, etc., has the least truth in it.

Thus, as to abstract nouns here, the rule only perplexes. I confess I do not understand particularizing an abstract idea: perhaps individualizing or personifying is meant. Ὁ νόμος may be abstract or not. If I have spoken of a particular νόμος, ὁ νόμος realizes that νόμος as an individual; or, as I should say, presents it as a definite object to the mind. If I have no such law mentioned, ὁ νόμος would be " the thing law," law viewed as an object before my mind as such. Abstract nouns are a kind of personification. " Law " does this, " law " does that. If I say διὰ νόμου, it is something that happens on that principle; it is only characteristic.

Anarthrous nominatives (such as καλός γὰρ θησαυρός παρ' ἀνδρῖ σπουδαίφ χάρις ὀφειλομένη, Isocr. ρ. 8 β: λόγος ἀληθής.... καὶ δίκαιος ψυχῆς αγαθής καὶ πιστῆς εἴδωλόν ἐστιν, Id. p. 28 a) express moral characteristics, beings or things that have a certain quality. It is what each is, anything that has this character. It is not an abstraction but a universal, that is, a species which is known by a predicate of each individual that has such a character. There may be many a χάρις, and all sorts of λόγοι not such as these. So πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος (Plat. Theact. 8) is the character of the measure used. Ὁ ἄνθρωπος would point out an object, the race viewed as one whole, where some specified individual was not meant (that is, if you please, one individual, real or ideal); it is always a subsisting thing to the mind, about which something is affirmed. Hence, as an abstract noun is an objective personification of the idea, it has the article. But a universal, or species, as in these anarthrous instances, is the character of all the individuals composing it. If a characteristic universal be not seized, it is impossible to understand the omission of the article in Greek.

An abstract noun as such has always the article, because it is always the personification of the idea, its reduction to an objective individual. But in so intellectual (or if you please imaginative) a language as Greek, it requires keen perception to see why or why not an article is used. Just so in English: " The daylight came." I am thinking of daylight as a positive substantive thing. " It was already daylight." Here daylight characterizes the state of atmosphere, of surrounding nature, spoken of as day. " It " is the mind's object, " daylight" the state or character of it. I could perfectly well say " Daylight came," and I should think of the state of the scene around me, though the thing characterized is not expressed. We have a strong case in νόμος παρεισῆλθεν. Ὁ νόμος would have been the Jewish law: here it would not do either, to say ὁ νόμος for the abstract idea. It was merely the legal principle which characterized the dealings of God, the state of things; but, as " daylight," it means the state in which the world is. This explains εἰρήνη ἐστί τάγαθόν. It is peace, a state of peace. You might have said ἡ εἰρήνη, and then it would have been the thing itself. But τἀγαθόν is not a predicate characterizing ειρήνη-does not affirm that peace is good, but that peace is the good thing, the one good thing. It is the abstract idea individualized. It would have been ἀγαθή if it had been a predicate.

In Matt. 1:1¹The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the son of David, the son of Abraham. (Matthew 1:1), (Βίβλος γενέσεως Ἰησοῦ Χρίστοῦ,) it is the common case of a title, and exceptional; as in English one might say, " Book of Wisdom; yet were I making a sentence, I should say, " The Book of Wisdom is so and so." It is elliptical. The name of what follows (not anything as to each) is τόν Μσαάκ. The article is usually put with known persons, because they are definite objects before the mind. Were one never heard of before, it would be anarthrous; but with the article it would be " that Isaac which you know so well of in Genesis, the well-known Isaac."

The same remark applies to Matt. 7:25, 27²⁵And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell not: for it was founded upon a rock. (Matthew 7:25)
²⁷And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell: and great was the fall of it. (Matthew 7:27). It is the well-known rain and floods; the rain came on. I should say in English, " The rain was very heavy on a particular day-the rain spoiled flowers." It is a well-known particular object in nature before the eyes. But it would be better to say, " The rain spoils the flowers," because both become objective. The rain did it. I could say, " Rain spoils flowers." This is aphoristic; which is always anarthrous, because essentially characteristic. If I say, " The rain spoiled," it is again objective -the rain on a given day in my mind. If I say, " It was not heat, it was rain spoiled them," rain becomes characteristic, in contrast with heat, of a state of the weather. It is something of a proper name, but a proper name has not an article when the person is not known or has not been mentioned.

As to Matt. 13:6⁶And when the sun was up, they were scorched; and because they had no root, they withered away. (Matthew 13:6) (ἡλίου ἀνατείλαντος) I do not accept the ἡλίου being a proper name. It is at sunrise-a characteristic state. I might say " the rising of the sun," as in Mark 16:2²And very early in the morning the first day of the week, they came unto the sepulchre at the rising of the sun. (Mark 16:2); then I have an object. So with γῆ, θάλασσα, κόσμος, οὐρανός, ἡμερα, ἀνήρ, γυνή, πατήρ, etc.

Again, τὸ ὄρος in Matt. 5:1 5 14: 23 5 Mark 3:13¹³And he goeth up into a mountain, and calleth unto him whom he would: and they came unto him. (Mark 3:13) (cf Luke 6:12, 17¹²And it came to pass in those days, that he went out into a mountain to pray, and continued all night in prayer to God. (Luke 6:12)
¹⁷And he came down with them, and stood in the plain, and the company of his disciples, and a great multitude of people out of all Judea and Jerusalem, and from the sea coast of Tyre and Sidon, which came to hear him, and to be healed of their diseases; (Luke 6:17)), does not mean some particular mountain well known by this name (as Wetstein and Rosenmiiller think); nor " a mountain" (as in the Authorized Version, Campbell, Newcome, Schleusner); but " the mountain " in the sense of the hill-country or highlands, in contrast with " the plain." The same principle accounts for τὴν πέτραν in Matt. 7:24, 25²⁴Therefore whosoever heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man, which built his house upon a rock: ²⁵And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell not: for it was founded upon a rock. (Matthew 7:24‑25); only that this is made more obvious by the expressed contrast in verse 26, of τήν ἄμμον. Just so with τὴν οἰκίαν, Matt. 9:10; 10:12, 13¹⁰And it came to pass, as Jesus sat at meat in the house, behold, many publicans and sinners came and sat down with him and his disciples. (Matthew 9:10)
¹²And when ye come into an house, salute it. ¹³And if the house be worthy, let your peace come upon it: but if it be not worthy, let your peace return to you. (Matthew 10:12‑13), in contrast with " without" or " the open air," and τῷ ἀγρῷ contrasted with " the city" or " town"; similarly eἰs τὸ πλοῖον " on board ship " (Matt. 13:2²And great multitudes were gathered together unto him, so that he went into a ship, and sat; and the whole multitude stood on the shore. (Matthew 13:2), etc.) in contrast with being " ashore," unless in cases where reference required the article, as perhaps in chapter 4: 21; 9:1. In Mark 1:45⁴⁵But he went out, and began to publish it much, and to blaze abroad the matter, insomuch that Jesus could no more openly enter into the city, but was without in desert places: and they came to him from every quarter. (Mark 1:45), εἰς πόλιν is purposely characteristic (and not a license because of the preposition, as is commonly said) " into town," any town: so εἰς ἀγρόν, in chapter 16: 12, and εἰς οἶκον in chapter 2:1, meaning " at home." The article might or might not be used in many cases; but the phrase or thought is never precisely the same.

With a proper name as such, one can hardly have an article, save as a reference, and this not immediate, I apprehend. If I say ὁ Ξενοφών, it is the well-known man, or the Xenophon I have been speaking about-always as a designated object of thought: why so, it may be a question which only appears afterward, and hence is anticipative. When the person is named historically, the article disappears; when spoken of as a direct object before the writer's mind, and meant to be so pointed out to the reader, the article is used (as in ordinary appellatives). When not thus referred to or presented, one cannot point out a name as a subject-matter of thought: it is a predicate then and anarthrous as usual.

So πᾶσα Ἱεροσόλυμα is not an exceptional case. Ἱερ. is a name, and as such without an article; and the name is necessarily an individual. You cannot gather a name of a city into one as a country or province, like πᾶσα ἡ Ἱουδαία. By the article a country is brought before the mind as one whole. But if one thinks of a name simply, the article is excluded, a name being not a thing but something said about a thing. The sense in this case is πᾶσα [ἡ πόλις, which city is called] Ἱεροσόλυμα. A river has the article; because from its nature, like a district, it needs this sign of unity as a whole.

Rom. 4:13¹³For the promise, that he should be the heir of the world, was not to Abraham, or to his seed, through the law, but through the righteousness of faith. (Romans 4:13) is a simple case of the general rule, to which I admit no exception for prepositions; διὰ νόμου was the character or way of his getting the promise. So διὰ δικαιοσύνης πίστεως " by righteousness of faith." It was not by law. The case is a very simple one. So in Rom. 1:17¹⁷For therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith: as it is written, The just shall live by faith. (Romans 1:17), ἐκ πίστεως characterizes the revelation, εἰς πίστιν the manner of its reception. God's righteousness is revealed (not merely διὰ but) ἐκ πίστεως, excluding claims of birth, ordinances, works, etc., by faith as the sole ground, εἰς πίστιν, and therefore open to faith wherever found.

The abstract noun is more abstract, if that could be said, with an article than without. It is in the essence of its nature, all things foreign to it apart; ἡ ἁμαρτία is " that thing called sin," as such in itself. A being is only what it is, or it is not that being, but another. Hence when it is said ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία, they are identical: one of the things before my mind is itself and no more; but the other is the same with it, as itself and no more. This is the effect of an article with an abstract noun.

There are nouns, it may be remarked here, which are generalizations more than abstractions. Thus νόμος: in general, it is a certain particular rule, and becomes a general idea of acting on the principle of a rule. In such cases it is hard to use the article without returning to the particular form which one has generalized. Law gives the idea of an actual concrete thing. Hence I have a mental difficulty to decide in Rom. 4:15¹⁵Because the law worketh wrath: for where no law is, there is no transgression. (Romans 4:15), whether it is abstract. It would be more naturally abstract law, " the thing law "; but with this word, which is first known as an actual existing objective code, it is difficult, when thus taken by itself, not to return to the particular. When ἡ ἁμαρτία is used, I should have no difficulty.

Objective is before the mind as an object, objective truths for instance. Subjective is the quality of mind by which opinions are formed. Thus I judge respecting God when I judge what He ought to be by what is in my own mind: objectively He is presented in revelation. Now what is objective has the article. It points out the object. (Logically it becomes the subject in a proposition, but this is another matter wholly.) The use of the article and all speech must depend on the view the mind takes of a thing; only where the speech is formed we have to judge what view has been taken.

Now the theory propounded is that the object of the mind has the article, the attributives or qualities have not, and that mentally. And here Middleton's theory (which indeed is merely the subject and predicate as to the metaphysical side of it) comes in. Ὁ is the object before the mind, that is, refers to it, explained by the word following in its nature or distinctive character. This forms the subject of a proposition; the predicate without the article (unless reciprocal) is affirmed about it. It is very simple, and has nothing to do with the view one's mind takes of the passage. It is a rule positive, that objects have, attributes or characteristics of objects have not, the article. When I find one, there is an object referred to; when none, it is qualification.

As after εἶχε, I have noticed in my paper (as Middleton also recognizes) verbs " to have " as taking an anarthrous noun. Ἡ γυνή would be some particular woman, or woman kind: that thing, the individual before our eyes or mind; or that thing, woman.

In Greek plays the choruses are noted for leaving out the article, and (unless emphatic) the tragedians before names.

That predicates have the article as apposition seems to me want of critical discernment. The βοῦν is some well-known ox, and then τόν is necessary.

Reasoning from English to Greek, save as arriving at abstract principles, is beside the mark. All verbs of existence (as Middleton recognizes) are (save on some exceptional account) without the article; because I must have, if I say " was," something existing before my mind. To the question " what" (qualification) is answered ἄνθρωπος. Now here ἐγένετο or ἐστί takes the same place as ὁ. I point out objectively, that is, affirm existence. I say what? Ἄνθρωπος. So εἶχε-what? ὄρνιν. Τὴν ὄρνιν is Greek equally, but it is a particular bird, already the object of the mind, that bird; not " what," but individual.

The first line of the Iliad, as Middleton remarks from Apollonius D., is not pure Greek. Μῆνιν ἄειδε, etc. In pure Attic it would be τὴν μῆνιν; but such things do not set aside the rule.

Again, with τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ Φίλιππον, which I cannot now trace, I should expect to find a mental reference in the writer to the king of Macedonia, or some such object, both names being distinctive or characteristic examples. I do not believe mentally τόν applies to either but may be mere freedom of style-using the article to the first and not for the second as in the same category; so in Acts 15:22²²Then pleased it the apostles and elders, with the whole church, to send chosen men of their own company to Antioch with Paul and Barnabas; namely, Judas surnamed Barsabas, and Silas, chief men among the brethren: (Acts 15:22). It is only where two agents come under one mental thought that this is the case. And I think in reference to it, Paul and Barnabas, or Alexander and Philip, become a single object to the mind. The idiom unites in the one article either two qualities of the same person or two persons under the same quality.

In the case of a proposition it is evident that the predicate is characteristic of the subject, its genus or category. Man is an animal. Where it is simply " there was," ἡν or ἐγένετο, what is this proposition? The noun answers to " what," just as the predicate does. When I say " was," " something was," what was? A man. In the ordinary proposition I have ὁ ἄνθρωπος as a subject before me; when I say εστίν, I wait to know what. If I say ἡν or ἐγένετο, I say What ήν or έγένετο? I answer ἄνθρωπος: it characterizes; it is the nature or category of the thing which exists, or an affirmation about it. Existence is the thing affirmed, or a something existing. " What " comes in the noun, and is anarthrous. If not, then ἄνθρωπος would be the subject, or the proposition reciprocal. If I say ἐστίν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, it is either man is something else, or it is reciprocal with a previous description and way expressed by οὕτος, σύ, etc. There is an exception where the absolute existing One comes in. I can say ὁ Θεός ἧν, ἦν ὁ λόγος. But this distinctly shows that existence is formally included in the affirmation of the verb. This only confirms the principle. I could not say ἔστίν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. I could say ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦν, because there it is historical, not absolute; that category of being was, καὶ ούκ ἐστί. So I could say on the sixth day ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος, because it is historical: here ὁ ἄνθρωπος is the subject, and existence is affirmed of him. So one might say ἐγένετο άνθρωπος: only here ἄνθρωπος becomes predicate, and hence individual, because " was " is one thing that was, and that one thing was man-a man. And this gives such a clear force to ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος: ἐν ἀρχῇ deprives it of created existence, giving ἦν absolute existence, and ὁ λόγος is necessarily an individual. No man takes it for a category of beings.

A noun is a mere name, the designation of " what" or character (not proper names of course). Thus house, man, cat, dog, in any language, names " what" a thing is, not an individual: ὁ points out and individualizes. In certain styles (which raise a question), as fables, proverbs, these may in a measure merge, because particular care is there taken to paint a character. Latin is metaphysically special in this and uses all nouns so, as venit homo. Number, unless by special designation, gives individuality, but the genius of the language is to abstract into kind. Greek is more material for individualism as to what is external; that is, ὁ is so. French is still more, which makes it the most exact and the most narrow language in the world, incapable of stating abstractions. It individualizes and materializes everything. Ἄνθρωπος, ἀνήρ, γυνή, is " what." Man, or a man, is a question of the style of the language. We think it must be a man, that is, we make it precise by a number. Ein mensch, ein matin, un homme, un uomo, un hambre, etc.; but in such a sentence it is really what kind of being came, though I may add only one (ein, a, un). In× German, unity is secured by emphasis on ein; in French, when it is distinctive, you must add seul, pas un homme being characteristic. You must say pas un seul homme; but un is not less " one " for all that. Ὁ though singular, is not this (though εἰς is so used at any rate in New Testament); it is indicative of personal individuality, and, if an abstraction or a contrasted part, as ἡ ἀγαπή or τό σώμα, is still this; it points out an individual in contrast with others. If there were only one man, I could not say ὁ unless in contrast with what was not man, as ὁ Θεός. Hence ὁ λόγος Θεὸς ἦν is no diminution of the force of Θεός, but only shows that it is not the whole individual Being in contrast with all others; ὁ Θεὸς is. Ὁ ἄνθρωπος, a particular known man, or ὁ ἄνθρωπος mankind, are both in contrast with others, that is, individualized or pointed out. So ἡ ἀγαπή does this, ἡ ἀγαπή does that. It is that quality or kind of thing that does it in contrast with others, as πύτης, ἐλπίς. But when these things are names by themselves, existence being in μένει, it is πίστπς, ἐλπίς, ἀγαπή, but the greatest of these is ἡ ἀγαπή, here individually contrasted. I know not whether I have brought this out so clearly in my paper, though the principle is there; but so it is.

Shades of style may vary. I may say, the renard, a certain renard, or Maitre Renard; but this a question of poetry or descriptive fable.

Βασιλεύς is constantly cited as the instance of an appellative passing into a name. It is not so. Thus, if I remember (why, I cannot say), it is used in the beginning of Homer without one -ὁ yap βασιλῆϊ χολωθείς (I cite from memory), meaning Agamemnon. There were many such titles in the East (Tartan for general, and others) which may have led to the use of it in Greek similarly, βασιλεύς being the word translated.-Πᾶν αἱμα is no difficulty. It is every case of blood shed, not all the blood as a whole. So πασα σάρξ. The article gives always the entire of what is said, as it points out one object as one: hence πᾶσα ἡ σάρξ would have been quite false. Ἐν παντὶ χρόνω also distributes the time: it was not a continuous whole Peter would speak of, but " at every time."

Again, οἰκοδομή presents no difficulty. It does not mean " a building " but " building." I doubt that it is ever used for " a building "; if so, by accommodation, as in English. Thus πᾶσα οἰκοδομή would be everything added by an act of building. This being adapted it grows to an entire whole. Indeed it is difficult to say πᾶσα ἡ οἰκοδομή αὔξει, and perhaps to this answers καὶ ὑμεῖς συνοικοδομεϊσθε. I mean the idea-without deciding on the reading.

The other two seeming anomalies are proper names. Now with a proper name as such I doubt you can have an article save as a reference, and then it is not immediate, I apprehend. I say πᾶσα ἡ Ἰουδαία, because I think of a country and bring it thus into one whole. But if I think of a name, I cannot use the article: a name is not a thing, but something said about a thing. If I say ὁ Ἰενοφών, it is the man well known, or that I have been speaking about, Xenophon. I cannot point out a name as a subject of thought, as it is a predicate of a thing. Hence πᾶσα Ἰεροσόλυμα is not an exceptional case; it is a name, as always, without an article. And the name is necessarily an individual. And I cannot gather the name of a city into one as a country: the sense is πᾶσα ἡ πόλις-which city is called Ἱερ.

I apprehend that πᾶς οἶκος Ἰσραήλ is similarly circumstanced. Πᾶς ὁ οἶκος would give one the idea of a material house. It is possible the figure might be so carried on; but the dropping of the article shows to me that the figure was dropped, and οίκος Ισραήλ is as one word. In English we say, "All the house of ": the force of the material thing is carried into the figure. But with a name, though we say " all," we have no article; it is " all Israel." We could not say " all the Israel "; we could say " the Israel of God," because we think of all the persons composing it, and assemble them by the "the" into one. Πᾶς ὁ οἶκος would arrest my mind at " house," and Israel be only its name-the name of the house. This is avoided, and οἶκος Ἱσραήλ is viewed as a unity carried by the name itself. One of the main points of the article is the gathering a composite thing into unity, making one whole of it to the mind, a name being the name of an individual and allowing by its nature no composite idea. It is one person. This can have no place here. Middleton was right therefore in connecting οἶκος with Ἰσραήλ. I judge that πᾶς οἶκος Ἰσραήλ has a peculiar and exceptional reason, from οίκος being used in opposition. In πᾶς ὁ οἶκος τοῦ Ἰσραήλ Israel would not have been itself the house, but it would have been a house belonging to Israel distinct from Israel. Οἶκος would have been distinctly designated as an object, and so separated from Israel; it is πᾶς Israel, but I mean the house, not the person.

We may add that Middleton takes indefiniteness for granted from the absence of the article, though showing its presence is not always a proof of definiteness. I have no objection to take ὁ as by itself (it is substantially the same principle, but from not seeing the mental or metaphysical noun M. broke down in prepositions and the like) and the noun, etc., as itself something stated about ὁ. Only the ὁ indicates something clear to the speaker, not yet to the hearer, ὁ being the person or thing I have in my mind, which is γεραιός, and then the hearer knows. When I say ὁ, I say something exists which I am thinking about: what I explain is what follows. Hence εστίν etc. meets the case without ὁ, in words of having. If I have, I must have something, and so on. Accounting for omissions is another thing from accounting for the use. Middleton's work did not require it, and he has not done it, save as illustrating the use and his theory; my principle does, and claims to account for every case, save only common and proverbial expressions which affect brevity, as "he is gone down town," they say in America: it is a useful abbreviation, but no question of grammar. " Gone into harbor " may mean a particular one, but it is a state; and so in Greek, εἰς λιμένα, κατὰ πόλιν, of Piraeus and Athens, quoted by Middleton. But these are special cases; not rule, but habit from locality, and found in all languages. I do not find Middleton treat such a case as γυνή εἶχε. But I find no omissions which are not explained by the answer to " What? " That is, an attributive or a personal name. With a genitive it is part of the word. In ψυχῆς ὄργανον τὸ σῶμα, ψυχῆς ὄργανον is one idea. You might say τὸ σῶμα ἐστι τὸ ὄργανον τῆς ψυχῆς, but there it would be reciprocal and exclusive, not merely attributive or a qualification. I take up ἄγγελος φαίνεται, ἄνθρωπος ἀπήντησε. Supposing for a moment that it was merely the Greeks not having an indefinite article, accounting for the article's use is not touched, nor the explanation of a multitude of omissions, when it might be by a given principle. But I am not content with this. In good Greek we should have generally τίς, as in Luke. Ἄγγελος Κυρίου I believe may be partly taken as Hebrew language in Matt. 1; 2 but we have in Mark ἄνθρωπος; in Luke ἄνθρωπος τις. I doubt its being strictly good Greek to leave it out, save in proverbs and apologues which affect what is characteristic and abound in such expressions in all languages (Greek has τίς, which has the sense of an indefinite article, and uses it); as we see in Luke 7:37³⁷And, behold, a woman in the city, which was a sinner, when she knew that Jesus sat at meat in the Pharisee's house, brought an alabaster box of ointment, (Luke 7:37) (Mark 5:25²⁵And a certain woman, which had an issue of blood twelve years, (Mark 5:25), γυνή τις), Mark 5:2, 21²And when he was come out of the ship, immediately there met him out of the tombs a man with an unclean spirit, (Mark 5:2)
²¹And when Jesus was passed over again by ship unto the other side, much people gathered unto him: and he was nigh unto the sea. (Mark 5:21), Luke 7:12¹²Now when he came nigh to the gate of the city, behold, there was a dead man carried out, the only son of his mother, and she was a widow: and much people of the city was with her. (Luke 7:12), etc., Luke 6:17¹⁷And he came down with them, and stood in the plain, and the company of his disciples, and a great multitude of people out of all Judea and Jerusalem, and from the sea coast of Tyre and Sidon, which came to hear him, and to be healed of their diseases; (Luke 6:17), Acts 6:7⁷And the word of God increased; and the number of the disciples multiplied in Jerusalem greatly; and a great company of the priests were obedient to the faith. (Acts 6:7), John 12:9⁹Much people of the Jews therefore knew that he was there: and they came not for Jesus' sake only, but that they might see Lazarus also, whom he had raised from the dead. (John 12:9), Acts 23:9⁹And there arose a great cry: and the scribes that were of the Pharisees' part arose, and strove, saying, We find no evil in this man: but if a spirit or an angel hath spoken to him, let us not fight against God. (Acts 23:9), Mark 7:25²⁵For a certain woman, whose young daughter had an unclean spirit, heard of him, and came and fell at his feet: (Mark 7:25), Matt. 9:20²⁰And, behold, a woman, which was diseased with an issue of blood twelve years, came behind him, and touched the hem of his garment: (Matthew 9:20). These passages my memory has furnished from scripture, and such have to be accounted for.

My conviction is that τίς answers to the indefinite article as to the absence of any word. The difference is this: τίς notes an individual object like ὁ, only generalized like " a," " an." The word by itself answers, as I said, to " what? " ὁ, τίς, or ὅστις gives one whole individual object. When there is nothing, it is a scene before me, the anarthrous word saying " what" it is. Thus several are with ἰδού, what? γννή, ὄχλος. The last generally has ὁ as contrasted with individuals, or the particular crowd that followed Jesus. But the article would be given with any known body of people, ὁ δῆμος. We have ὄχλος πολύς πλῆθος. We have also ἄνθρωπος as in Matt. 4:4, 13:28, 31. A concordance will furnish many others.

The result of the use of these words to my mind confirms the principle: ὁ is a whole, a particular individual, τις an individual separated in thought from others. The absence of the article simply in the nominative is always characteristic, not individual. In Luke it is generally τις, and better Greek. Ὄχλος τις could hardly be, because it is a confusion of individuals, a crowd, and can scarcely be individualized; ὁ suits, for it is a known pointed out crowd. When I say ἄνθρωπος τις, I separate that man from others; so ἄγγελος τις, I think of other angels, etc. When I say, ἄνθρωπος, ἄγγελος, γυνή, I think of the kind of being.

Hence in proverbs, parables, fables, which describe, it is more usual to omit the article, unless they read as if a real history. Chat echaude is the kind of thing, un chat echaudo is an individual cat. English has not this unless very rarely in proverbs. If I say ἄγγελος, it is not ἄνθρωπος or other means employed. If I say ἄγγελος τις it is distinct from other angels. I do not know that I have discussed this form of its application, but it is the same principle. The absence of the article gives kind or attributives, not an objective individual, though it may be such. Grammarians must not make a rule for what is merely the shortening tendency of habits of speech. All aphorisms or substantive statements as such are anarthrous. Perhaps brevity occasioned it; but in fact they are in their very nature essentially characteristic and only so-it is their object. Chat echaude craint I'eau froide. Chat echaude characterizes the thing which fears even cold water; I'eau froide is not grammatical, it would be de I'eau froide.

So πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος is all essentially characteristic; were it τῶν χρημάτων, it would be a certain set of things. So here of ἄνθρωπος: the being that has this character or title is measure of all things. Here a measure would do in English, or the, because it is merely characteristic, no object: in fact, it is the predicate. Man is not here looked at as a person; it means humanity, or what man is.

Take again Isocr. page 8, B; καλός θησαυρὸς παρ' ἀνδρι σπουδαίω χάρις ὀφειλομένη: Id. page 28, α, λόγος ἀληθής καὶ νόμιμος καὶ δίκαιος ψυχῆς ἀγαθῆς καὶ πιστής εἴΐδωλον ἐστι. In all these cases the phrases express moral characteristics, and are not viewed as objects of the mind. It has the force of anything that has this character-a χάρις ὀφ.- λόγος ἀληθής, any one which is such. This is not an abstraction but a universal; that is, a species which is known by a character, a predicate of each individual which has such a character. There may be all sorts of λόγοι, but not such as this. Ὁ points out an object, an individual if you please, a real subsisting thing to the mind about which I affirm something. An abstract noun (not a universal) is an objective personification of the idea, and hence as such would have the article; but a universal, or species, is the character of all the individuals composing it. Its being in the place of the predicate changes nothing. When I say ἄνθρωπος, it is evidently such; it is the character of all the beings of the species. It is this character which makes it a μέτρον; the individual man is-that would not be characteristic. And when I put the article, it ceases to be characteristic and becomes an object; ό ἄνθρωπος ἐστι ζῶον λογικόν. I personify the whole race in order to predicate something about it. This would not do for an aphoristic sentence. See the multitude of sentences in James of this character.

Matt. 14:25²⁵And in the fourth watch of the night Jesus went unto them, walking on the sea. (Matthew 14:25) furnishes also a usage from abbreviation as in English. " I had fourth watch ": regular English would give " the fourth watch " contrasted with the third. But this is needless; it is the short characteristic of a known object. Quakers say, " fourth day," " third month," not " the." It is the same principle but more obscurely. So as to Matt. 22:38³⁸This is the first and great commandment. (Matthew 22:38). The Jews measured the commandments to make out righteousness; as ποία ἐντολή μεγάλη says the young man (which has this well-known character). The Lord answers, not by formally comparing this with other commandments, but by so characterizing it. I do not think He means a first and great, though the grammar would bear it, but an absolute characteristic. This is first and great; but δευτέρα only by δευτέρα, the commandment so to be characterized. But this is brief familiarity of language, not grammatical distinction.

Ἐν ἀρχῇ, John 1:1¹In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. (John 1:1), is evident; ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ would at once lead me to the beginning of something, whereas ἐν ἀρχῇ is characteristically (that is, universally and absolutely) such. This form of thought is rare in English, but is found " in measure," " in part," but only where it has become from use characteristic and abstract. In Greek it is much more common, particularly with ἐν, as also with ἐκ. When a word in English is used characteristically, the form is found, particularly in characteristic words, " in anger," " in pain"; but we say " in a bad temper," because it is one kind of temper.

I should rather suppose Acts 7:36³⁶He brought them out, after that he had showed wonders and signs in the land of Egypt, and in the Red sea, and in the wilderness forty years. (Acts 7:36) to be used as a proper name; the rather as we have ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ in the same passage. Αἰγύπτω and ἐρυθρφ are as articles, that is, indicate an object, as a name sufficiently does.

In John 4:37³⁷And herein is that saying true, One soweth, and another reapeth. (John 4:37), Ι apprehend, ὁ ἀληθινός must be taken as an attribute of ὁ λόγος, not as a predicate; "in this is the true word " [verified]; whereas in 1 Peter 5:12¹²By Silvanus, a faithful brother unto you, as I suppose, I have written briefly, exhorting, and testifying that this is the true grace of God wherein ye stand. (1 Peter 5:12) it is the usual form. In the former ἐστίν has the sense of subsists. I find Winer and Middleton both take it so.

If we cannot seize characteristic universals, we shall never get at the use of the article.

As to the article in τοῦ μηνός, it is no way difficult; it is like the month, has the force of each, and points out a particular month, inasmuch as it is each one. Distinctive parts would have the article as in contrast with another part: as " a half" is only a quantity, " the half" is in contrast with the other half. Contrast always has it. A class would bear no article; it is an idea, not an existence, being a predicate of something else, as πατήρ is a character, not an existing one pointed out. So ἄνθρωπος, Θεός, though the words may become by an article a specifically existing object. Words joined by a conjunction are also persons joined to some idea by the article, or the same person as ὁ Θεὸς καὶ σωτήρ. These are qualities of the one who is ὁ. It is sometimes irregular in form; as, when there are two ambassadors, ὁ is with the first only, but the reason remains the same.

I do not deny that there is a difference when the adjective is first and when the noun is first, though it is hardly apparent sometimes. It is so in French, but the object, c'est un temps rude, is in contrast with doux or agriable; while un rude temps is but one idea. I apprehend it is the same in Greek. I doubt the exactitude of Hermann's rule, that in οἱ οἰκτροί παῖδες the principal stress is on οἰκτροί, in οἱ π. Οἱ οἰκτροί it is rather on παῖδες. For in ὁ ποιμήν ὁ καλός there is emphasis on καλός. In the phrase ὁ κ. π. there is no emphasis anywhere, only distinction from one not καλός. So in τό άγιον πν. it is the Holy Spirit, not another; but τὸ πν. Τὸ ἅγιον brings ἅγιον into relief.

As for the expression τῷ ἁμαρτωλῷ (Luke 18:13¹³And the publican, standing afar off, would not lift up so much as his eyes unto heaven, but smote upon his breast, saying, God be merciful to me a sinner. (Luke 18:13)), it is evidently distinctive, as if I should say, Who is the sinner of the world? The publican answers, I am. He is the sinner. It is contrast, but so characterized in comparison with all others.

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